Chagos Islands Treaty

Thank you to everyone who has contacted me to raise concerns about the Government’s deal transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. I have followed developments, and I remain deeply concerned that, despite adjustments and public statements, the core issues remain unresolved.

The agreement signed in May 2025 recognises Mauritian sovereignty over all the islands, while allowing the UK, with US co-operation, to lease back the strategically vital base on Diego Garcia for at least 99 years under a new long-term lease.

The Government claims this protects UK and allied security interests. The peer-reviewed report by the House of Lords International Agreements Committee even concluded that, “if not ratified, Mauritius is likely to resume its campaign to obtain a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the UK”, potentially threatening control of the base.

But we have to ask, at what cost?

Why the Deal Still Fails

• No guaranteed return or resettlement for the displaced Chagossian people. Under the Treaty, Mauritius may offer resettlement on all islands except Diego Garcia. But nothing guarantees that Chagossians will be allowed to return, and many fear this is effectively a permanent denial of their right to go home.

• Unclear environmental protections. The archipelago is home to one of the last pristine marine environments in the Indian Ocean. The Treaty refers to a protected area — but provides few guarantees that fragile ecosystems will be safeguarded once economic or development pressure increases. Environmental safeguards remain vague.

• Opaque financial and security commitments. The UK will reportedly pay Mauritius around £101 million per year under the leaseback, totalling roughly £3.4 billion over the 99-year term, according to government estimates. In return, we get a base leaseback, but that raises serious questions about whether we are purchasing what was once sovereign territory, rather than preserving it.

• Lack of transparency and inadequate consultation. Many Chagossians feel their community was excluded from meaningful consultation on the deal. The forced removal of Chagossians in the 1960s and 1970s remains a dark chapter. Decades on, they deserve clarity, recognition, and a proper chance to return under safe, secure, and dignified conditions.

• Risk to long-term strategic stability. While the Treaty allows for the continued operation of Diego Garcia as a UK-US base, that guaranteed lease may come under pressure if political changes or new global priorities shift. Relying on a 99-year lease may not be enough if the balance between strategic interest, cost, and public scrutiny changes.

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Why I’m Not Convinced and Will Keep Pressing

I recognise that the Government and proponents argue that this deal secures a vital strategic asset for the long term. I am not dismissing the importance of national security. But the notion of “security” should not come at the expense of justice, transparency, and basic human rights, especially when a community was forcibly removed decades ago.

This agreement moves too fast and gives too little. On behalf of constituents, and, more importantly, on behalf of the displaced Chagossian people, I will continue to push for:

• A binding guarantee of the right to return and resettlement for Chagossians;

• Robust, legally enforceable environmental protections for the entire archipelago;

• Transparent publication of all financial details of the lease and trust fund;

• Full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability before any ratification;

• An open, ongoing dialogue with the Chagossian community and their representatives.

  
  

Our foreign policy cannot be built on silence, secrecy, or deals done in haste. If Britain is to act, it must act with integrity.